Two Chinese Spies Get Busted (How Many Are Still Out There?)

Two Chinese nationals have been charged with spying for China’s Ministry of State Security. They were both arrested Friday.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) said Chinese national Yuance Chen, who resides in Happy Valley, Oregon, and Liren Lai, who traveled to Houston on a tourist visa in April 2025, were arrested on Friday. Both individuals face charges of overseeing and carrying out various clandestine intelligence tasks in the U.S. on behalf of the Ministry of State Security.

Along with assisting with the recruitment of potential MSS assets and gathering intel about service members and bases, the two men are accused of facilitating a “dead drop” payment of cash on behalf of the MSS.

According to a DOJ press release, Lai recruited Chen several years ago and then gave him jobs to do, including attempts to recruit spies inside the US military.

As alleged in the criminal complaint, Lai recruited Chen to work on behalf of the MSS in or about 2021. While in Guangzhou, China, in January 2022, Lai and Chen worked together to facilitate a dead-drop payment of at least $10,000 on behalf of the MSS, working with other individuals located in the United States to leave a backpack with the cash at a day-use locker at a recreational facility located in Livermore, California.

Following the January 2022 dead drop, Lai and Chen continued to work on behalf of the MSS, including by attempting to help identify potential assets for MSS recruitment within the ranks of the U.S. Navy. For example, in 2022 and 2023, Chen was tasked by Lai to visit a U.S. Naval installation in Washington State and a U.S. Navy recruitment center in San Gabriel, California. While in the recruitment center, Chen obtained personal information for recruits that he appears to have transmitted to an MSS intelligence officer in China. The complaint also alleges that Chen received instruction from the MSS on how to engage and recruit future Sailors and methods for minimizing his risk of exposure. Eventually, Chen began contacting a Navy employee over social media and provided information about the employee to the MSS. The complaint alleges that Chen traveled to Guangzhou and met with MSS intelligence officers in April 2024 and March 2025 in order to discuss compensation and specific taskings.

It sounds like the military personnel they planned to recruit were Chinese Americans.

While at the recruitment center, Chen allegedly took photos of a bulletin board that contained the names, programs and hometowns of Navy recruits. The majority of those listed on the board noted that their hometown was “China,” and the photos appeared to be transmitted to an MSS intelligence officer in China, the DOJ claimed.

This is not the first such case like this. There was another one just last year.

The case is one in a series of prosecutions concerning Chinese intelligence-gathering, including concerning the military.

Last year, for instance, the Justice Department charged five Chinese nationals with lying and trying to cover their tracks, more than a year after they were confronted in the dark near a remote Michigan military site where thousands of people had gathered for summer drills.

In May the Stanford Review published an article about foreign students on campus being approached to spy for China.

This summer, a CCP agent impersonated a Stanford student. Under the alias Charles Chen, he approached several students through social media. Anna*, a Stanford student conducting sensitive research on China, began receiving unexpected messages from Charles Chen. At first, Charles’s outreach seemed benign: he asked about networking opportunities. But soon, his messages took a strange turn.

Charles inquired whether Anna spoke Mandarin, then grew increasingly persistent and personal. He sent videos of Americans who had gained fame in China, encouraged Anna to visit Beijing, and offered to cover her travel expenses. He would send screenshots of a bank account balance to prove he could buy the plane tickets. Alarmingly, he referenced details about her that Anna had never disclosed to him…

Under the guidance of experts familiar with espionage tactics, Anna contacted authorities. Their investigation revealed that Charles Chen had no affiliation with Stanford. Instead, he had posed as a Stanford student for years, slightly altering his name and persona online, targeting multiple students, nearly all of them women researching China-related topics…

After interviewing multiple anonymous Stanford faculty, students, and China experts, we can confirm that the CCP is orchestrating a widespread intelligence-gathering campaign at Stanford. In short, “there are Chinese spies at Stanford.”

The Chinese Communist Party never stops trying to lie, cheat and steal its way to success. We seem more aware of this now than in the past but I wonder what percentage of these efforts are actually getting caught.